Terrorism Without a Motive
By Daniel Greenfield
SultanKnish.Blogspot.com
Means, opportunity and motive are the three
crucial elements of investigating a crime and
establishing the guilt of its perpetrator. Means and
opportunity tell us how the crime could have been
committed while motive tells us why it was
committed. Many crimes cannot be narrowed down by
motive until a suspect is on the scene; but acts of
terrorism can be. Almost anyone might be responsible
for a random killing; but political killings are
carried out by those who subscribe to common
beliefs.
Eliminate motive from terrorism and it becomes no
different than investigating a random killing. If
investigators are not allowed to profile potential
terrorists based on shared beliefs rooted in
violence, that makes it harder to catch terrorists
after an act of terror and incredibly difficult
before the act of terror takes place.
The roadblock isn't only technical; it's conceptual.
Investigations consist of connecting the dots. If
you can't conceive of a connection, then the
investigation is stuck. If you can't make the leap
from A to B or add two to two and get four, then you
are dependent on lucky breaks. And lucky breaks go
both ways. Sometimes investigators get lucky and
other times the terrorists get lucky.
Federal law enforcement was repeatedly warned by the
Russians that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was dangerous, but
operating under the influence of a political culture
that refused to see Islam as a motive for terrorism,
it failed to connect the dots between Chechen
violence in Russia and potential terrorism in the
United States, and because it could not see Islam as
a motive, as a causal factor rather than a casual
factor, it could find no reason why Tamerlan was a
threat not just to Russia, but also to the United
States.
The missing motive factor has led to a rash of lone
wolf terrorists whose acts are classified as
individual crimes. Nidal Hasan's killing spree at
Fort Hood was put down to workplace violence, but
workplace violence isn't a motive, it's a bland
description. The motive was obvious in Hasan's
background and his behavior; but the military, an
organization that by its nature has to be able to
predict the actions of the enemy, had been crippled
and left unable to see Islam as a motive.
The current working concept is that by refusing to
allow our military and law enforcement to identify
Islam as a motive, we are stifling terrorist
recruitment by preventing Muslim from identifying
terrorist attacks with Islam. This ostrich theory of
terror assumes that if we blind ourselves to the
motives of the terrorists, then potential terrorists
will likewise be blinded to their own motives.
Any law enforcement protocol that prevents
investigators from understanding the motives of the
killers in the hope that this will take away that
motive from the killers is absurdly backward. The
investigators of terror are not the instigators of
terror. A police detective arresting a rapist does
not create rape. An FBI agent arresting a terrorist
does not create terror. Identifying a crime does not
create the crime. It makes it easier for law
enforcement and the public to fight that crime.
The insidious infiltration of blowback theory into
terrorist investigations has dangerously subverted
the ability of investigators to get to the truth and
to catch the terrorists. Blowback theory assigns
each act of Islamic terror an origin point in our
actions. Everything that Muslim terrorists do is
caused by something that we did. To those who
believe in this linkage, the only way to fight
Muslim terror is to stop inspiring it. The only way
to defeat Islamic terrorism is to defeat ourselves.
Blowback theory has been dressed up in academic
language and expert jargon, but all it amounts to is
Stockholm Syndrome with a lecture hall. Its
essential postulate is that if we become more
passive in our responses, a strategy that is usually
described with the complementary term, "smart", as
in "smart war" and "smart investigation", then the
enemy will become more passive in response to our
passivity because we are no longer inspiring his
violence.
Smart wars and smart investigations are those that
don't offend Muslims. The cost of the smart war in
Afghanistan has been a very expensive and bloody
defeat. The cost of the smart investigation can be
seen in the streets of Boston or in Fort Hood.
Any smart tactic based on inaction and ignorance,
on throwing away advantages to seem less
provocative, is not smart; it's stupid. When things
go unsaid because they are politically incorrect,
then they will eventually go undone. And when they
are both unsaid and undone, then it becomes
impossible to think them. The concepts fade out of
reach, the connections in what, Hercule Poirot,
called the little grey cells, are no longer made and
what was once a familiar mental shortcut becomes an
entirely alien concept.
Defeating ourselves in order to defeat Islamic
terrorism is a dead end because we are not the
source of that terrorism; we are its target. When we
handicap ourselves out of a misguided notion that
the best way to fight terrorism is with one hand
tied behind our backs and an eyepatch on one eye,
then Americans die.
Islamic terrorism, once the starting point of any
rational investigation, has become an uncomfortable
endpoint uttered by uncooperative suspects who
refuse to go along with the stress-motivated killing
spree defense their lawyers are eager to put forward
for them. It is the dark thing at the end of every
investigation that politicians don't want to talk
about, reporters don't want to write about and
prosecutors grow reluctant to discuss for fear of
offending judges and stifling career prospects.
Without Islam as a motive, there is no way to fight
the larger threat except as a discrete collection of
seemingly random events. What connects a Tamerlan
Tsarnaev to a Nidal Hasan to Ahmed in Jersey City or
Mohamed in Minneapolis plotting the next attack? The
official answer is nothing. One was a boxer and
another was an army doctor and the third is just an
Egyptian student or a Somali bank clerk. They have
no motive in common except that of Islam.
Motives identify links. They make it easier to stack
events together as a trend. They make it possible to
predict the next attack by looking at the common
denominators that matter as opposed to the ones that
don't. And above all else, they combine together to
give us a rational picture of the world so that we
understand what we are experiencing and what we have
to do about it.
A man dropped onto a battlefield without having the
concept of an army or a war will be bewildered and
horrified by the incomprehensible experience of
large numbers of individuals shooting at him for no
reason. "Why do they all want to kill me?" he
thinks. "Was it something I did?"
Crime is personal. War is impersonal. The murderer
has personal motives for his actions, but the
motives of the soldier are irrelevant. In war, it is
the organization that matters more than the
individual. Wasting time predicting the movements of
individual soldiers instead of armies is not
productive. Attempting to understand terrorists as
individuals, rather than members of a mass movement
is equally a waste of time.
Media accounts have presented various exculpatory
motives for Tamerlan Tsarnaev ranging from the
possible head injuries he may have suffered as a
boxer to the murder of a best friend that
investigators suspect he may carried out. All these
motives are irrelevant, not because they may not
have some figment of truth to them, but because they
stopped mattering once he became what he was. One
soldier may join the army because his girlfriend
broke up with him, another because he lost his job
and a third because he wants to impress his friends.
Those motives may all be true, but they don't
matter. Once organized into a collective, their
individual motives stop mattering and the collective
motive takes over.
Islamic terrorism is a collective motive. There is
limited variation in the tactics and the thinking of
terrorists. Whatever they may have been before they
fully committed themselves to the war against
civilization is an incidental matter. And the only
piece of individual identity that matters is still
the collective one of their Islamic background. That
is still the greatest predictive factor of
terrorism.
The Islamic terrorist abandons his individuality and
takes on an identity that asks him to love death
more than life. His motives are no longer personal,
but collective. He is a soldier in the Islamic war
against civilization. His marching orders may come
from Jihadi videos and magazines, but they provide
him with training and an esprit de corps sufficient
to the purposes of his campaign of terror. To strive
to understand him as a father or a son, as a boxer
or a doctor, is a waste of time. These biographical
footnotes no longer represent him. They are the
things he has discarded to become a messenger of
death in obedience to a faith that values death more
than life.
Without understanding that, the terrorist becomes a
cipher, another nice young man who suddenly turned
violent, and the trend of terrorist attacks ceases
to be a pattern and becomes a rash of horrifying
incidents that can happen at any time.
Terrorism is a form of war. It cannot be won without
understanding that there is a battlefield and an
enemy fighting for control of that battlefield.
Without that understanding, our superiority in
strength and our possession of the battlefield can
only result in a temporary stalemate leading to a
permanent defeat.
Terrorism denial turns terrorist attacks into a
cipher without a motive. If Tamerlan and Dzhokar
Tsarnaev had not carried out their attack at a
public event in the age of the ubiquitous camera,
then how long would law enforcement have chased down
dead ends or searched for the Tea Party tax
protesters that the political establishment expected
them to find?
Without a motive, there is no place to begin
searching. Without Islam, there is no motive.
Terrorism denial isn't just an intellectual error;
it is a grave danger to the lives of Americans.
Terrorism denial created a space in which the
Tsarnaev brothers were free to plot and kill.
Terrorism denial cost the lives of three Americans
and the bodily integrity of hundreds of others.
Denying the Islamic motive for terror, makes it
harder for law enforcement officer to do their job
and easier for Muslim terrorists to do theirs.