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By Maj. Gen. Jerry R. Curry (ret'd)
CurryforAmerica.com
On March 27th of this year President Obama announced that after a careful policy review he and his Administration had adopted “a comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan,” Unlike President Bush’s, his policy would be successful. It would defeat the Taliban and, “enhance the military, governance and economic capacity” of Afghanistan.
Mr. Obama seems to be having second thoughts about the brilliant strategy that he adopted last spring. He appears to be looking for a way to distance himself from it while tossing the strategy, his military leaders, and the Karzai government under the “Change” bus! Just last March he said, “Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor, Pakistan.” Now he’s not so sure whether or not he’s willing to pay the price necessary to strengthen Pakistan militarily and politically by purposing to win the Afghan War.
Part of Obama’s problem seems to be one of definition. He has mixed strategy with tactics. Strategy has to do with long range planning. Tactics has to do with the short range art and science of maneuvering forces in combat. Tactics can be changed at any time. But once strategy is set, it must be followed to the end of the war or at least to the end of a phase of that war.
As an example, in World War II the strategy adopted was that once the war in Europe was won, only then could maximum effort be directed toward winning the war in the Pacific. Obama established his Afghan War strategy in March. Now he wants to rethink and change it. He doesn’t seem to realize that strategically the train has left the station and his opportunity to change course is now limited.
His March strategy made a lot of sense then and still does today. He was correct when he said, “To succeed, we and our friends and allies must reverse the Taliban’s gains, and promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government … the world cannot afford the price that will come due if Afghanistan slides back into chaos.”
Victory requires the deployment of a sufficient number of troops in Afghanistan to get the job done, married to the proper mixture of tactics. For example, in some cases we can win the hearts and minds of tribesmen and villagers by providing civil security and improved economic and living conditions. In other instances hearts and minds will follow only after strong coercion has been exercised.
Each situation has unique requirements that must be handled differently. Tactics have to be varied and tailored to meet the requirements of the peculiar state of affairs in each district and its individual culture. What works in one valley or village, may not work over the mountain in the next valley or village. Yes, we can win the war in Afghanistan. But are we and our allies willing to pay the price necessary to win?
I address some of these requirements in my book, From Private to General: An African American Soldier Rises Through the Ranks. On pages 175 and 176, the following quote shows that contrary to today’s popular belief, some lessons learned in the Vietnamese War can be applied to the Afghan War. Page 106 also provides some interesting Afghan War insights.
“After this victory, 41st ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) combat operations continued in high gear. The regiment continuously located and destroyed well entrenched VC (Viet Cong) units. Perhaps Binh Dinh Province will be pacified after all, I mused.
Often during those weeks, (Colonel) Vy returned to the subject of my departure. He seemed obsessed with it. Finally one evening at supper he blurted out, ‘Colonel Curry, you must not stay here as my advisor.’
‘Don’t look so grim, Colonel,’ I said. ‘I am staying. You can count on it. The last few months your regiment has killed more VC, captured more enemy weapons, and won more battles that any other ARVN regiment in the corps. I really mean it when I say that I am proud to serve with you.’
Sadly he replied, ‘Thank you my friend. I appreciate your sincerity. But I must beg you to leave as quickly as possible. If you do not,’ his head dropped, ‘I shall be relieved of my command … We Vietnamese military commanders work on a cycle,’ he explained. ‘When a new U.S. Advisor arrives, I instruct the regiment to pretend that it doesn’t know how to conduct combat operations. The advisor always prescribes extensive training, just as you did when you arrived ...’
‘Are you saying that all the U.S. advisors who leave Vietnamese units after six or seven months, and who think that they have accomplished so much, have in reality been manipulated?’
‘Yes,’ he slowly explained. ‘So long as elementary training and squad-level operations are taking place, the regiment suffers few casualties. When combat operations are stepped up, more of my soldiers are killed or wounded,’ His dark brown eyes pleaded for understanding … ‘To my superiors, keeping casualties low is more important than killing VC. If I do not immediately reduce the numbers of our casualties, I will be relieved of my command.’
‘Let me be sure I understand. The United States of America is risking the lives of its sons and daughters and spending exorbitant amounts of U.S. taxpayer’s money, to help South Vietnam win your war as quickly as possible, so you can preserve your nation’s freedom. But your commanders’ objective is to minimize Vietnamese military casualties?’
‘Precisely...’
‘You understand that this undermines the whole purpose of my country’s sending military forces here to help your country?’”
It is neither Obama’s second thoughts nor his search for a successful strategy that will decide whether or not the war in Afghanistan will be won. It is whether or not he and our allies are willing to pay the price necessary to defeat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, plus off-set Pakistan’s insurgent gains.
In many ways Obama’s Afghanistan War will be the
Vietnamese War revisited, unless the present administration determines to
understand the unique mindsets and paradigms represented in
Afghanistan and then purposely pursues a military
victory as the only acceptable course of action.