In Defense of 'Carrots and Sticks'

CUBA

BRIEF

Information and Analysis from the

Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies

University of Miami

April 6, 2009

In Defense of “Carrots and Sticks”

*José Azel

In a recent “Reflection of Comrade Fidel,” the Cuban leader warns the new U.S. administration not to pursue a “carrot and stick” approach in its foreign policy towards Cuba. Similarly, in its recently released report “Cuba: A New Policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement” the Brookings Institution echoes Castro’s words: “…we should avoid the mistake of adopting a carrot and stick policy.” The Brookings report recommends a number of unilateral U.S. initiatives adamantly insisting that the U.S. should seek nothing in return. It states, “None of the initiatives, however, should be publicly or privately tied to specific Cuban actions. As the Cuban government is on record as rejecting any type of carrot and stick tactic, it would be counterproductive to do so.”

This is an extraordinary Chamberlainian statement that begs the question, why is the pursuit of a quid pro quo an illicit tool of political give and take? Why is the mutual search for compromise between two disputing parties an illegitimate and irresponsible quest as claimed by Fidel Castro and the Brookings Institution?

Effective diplomacy, or for that matter negotiations in all spheres of life, require the parties to be willing to make concessions. No diplomatic effort aimed at seeking concessions from an opponent can succeed if one of the parties elects to give up all its bargaining chips before the negotiations begin. Unilateral and unconditional abandonment of ones bargaining position is not a logical basis for constructive engagement. Why is insisting on legitimate concessions a moral or practical failure? The concessions the U.S. seeks are not onerous. They are of the highest moral value such as the release of Cuba’s political prisoners and respect for human rights.

The Brookings report seems to justify its recommended approach with a comprehensive mea culpa that blames U.S. foreign policy for all the ills of Cuba’s polity. In its opening paragraph the report states, “…it would be wrong to attribute lack of economic and political freedom on the island solely or mainly to U. S. actions.” This sentence suggests that Cuba’s repressive regime and its disastrous economic policies are only marginally responsible for the dismal state of Cuba’s society. At a minimum the sentence assigns a disproportionate responsibility for Cuba’s lack of economic and political freedom to U.S. policy. What exactly is it about any U.S.-Cuba policy that keeps the Cuban government from allowing economic and political freedoms in Cuba? Allowing economic and political freedoms is entirely within the domain of Cuba’s government. It is not, in any way, impeded by U.S. policy. Cuba’s abysmal sociopolitical and economic conditions are the direct result of the failed policies of the Cuban government, and not of the so called failed policies of the U.S. government.

The centerpiece of U.S.-Cuba policy should be the honorable effort- ineffectual as it may be perceived- to enhance the civil liberties and political rights of Cubans. This is the policy that both Democratic and Republican administrations have followed toward Latin America for the past 30 years. Granted, we may not be able to effectively influence that process in Cuba, but that does not mean we should unilaterally abandon positions designed to induce democratic behavior.

Diplomatic engagement with an adversary rarely, if ever, succeeds by merely appealing to the adversary’s higher principles. It is an implausible strategy with the likes of Ahmadinejad, Kim Jong-il, or Castro, where the vigorous interaction of values and diplomacy are necessary. By definition, diplomacy and diplomatic engagement are about negotiations to find mutually acceptable solutions to a common challenge. Giving away all U.S. bargaining positions in return for nothing is not a mutually acceptable solution. In negotiations, when an unconditional concession is given, the other party pockets it and moves on to its next demand. That is precisely what the Castro government would do with the recommended giveaways. In the real world, if one arrives at the negotiating table empty handed, one is sure to leave empty handed.

* Dr. José Azel is a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami.